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Introduction
A key insight from the environmental economics literature is that, when appropriately designed, environmental policy can strongly affect both technological progress and the diffusion of less pollution-intensive or less cost-intensive abatement technologies. 1 The intuitive nature of the relationship between policy stringency and incentives to develop and adopt 'green' technologies is positive and monotonic, i.e. stricter policy raises both R&D and the diffusion of abatement technologies. Such monotonicity results are derived for instance, by Unold (2001, 2003) for the case of diffusion and by Requate (2005b) for R&D incentives. A monotonic relationship is also commonly assumed in empirical tests of induced innovation/diffusion hypotheses (see e.g. Jaffe and Palmer 1997 , Newell 1999 , Popp 2002 , Kerr and Newell 2003 , Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003 , Carrión-Flores and Innes 2010 .
For the case of R&D incentives there are however a couple of contributions questioning monotonic relationship between the stringency of environmental regulation and innovation incentives. For example, Ulph (1997) establishes an ambiguous relationship between the level of a tax on emissions and R&D spending for an imperfectly competitive polluting industry.
Similar results have been established in models with international Cournot oligopolies (e.g. Simpson and Bradford 1996) . Baker et al. (2008) conjecture that, if high abatement levels are required, technologies featuring increased MAC for high levels of abatement will be replaced by backstop-type technologies. In contrast to the present paper, their argument relies on the availability of three distinct technologies and is not formally proven. Denicolò (1999), Farzin and Kort (2000) and Baker and Shitu (2006) derive related results for non-monotonicity in R&D incentives (Denicolò 1999 and Shitu 2006) and investment into an abatement capital stock (Farzin and Kort 2000) .
Our aim here is to examine the relationship between the stringency of environmental policy and the rate of technology adoption. We look at a simple model with many (small) firms characterized by their short-term (marginal) abatement cost (MAC) curves. Each firm can adopt an advanced technology that induces a new MAC curve. However, instead of making the typical assumption that R&D shifts down the MAC curves 2 , we assume that the MAC curves of the old and the new technology intersect each other. The possibility and relevance of such a representation of technological change has recently been pointed out by several authors (see Amir at al. 2008 , Baker et al. 2008 , Baumann et al. 2008 , Brechet and Jouvet 2008 . Amir et al. (2008) even show that technological progress induced by the reduction of emission coefficients within a neoclassical production function necessarily leads to decreasing
MACs for high emission levels but increasing MACs when the targeted emission level is sufficiently low. The intuition for the arising of such a pattern is straightforward in the case where the only way to reduce emissions (other than adopting the new technology) is reducing output and MACs of the old 'technology' are strictly downward sloping. Adopting a technology that reduces the emission coefficient clearly reduces unregulated emissions.
However, any further emission reduction requires sacrificing more units of output than with the conventional technology exactly because the emission coefficient has been reduced. An important insight of these contributions is that there exists a broad, and widely used class of green technologies 3 for which the MAC curves of the old and new technology intersect.
To complement previous theoretical monotonicity results and check their robustness, we consider environmental technological progress that triggers such intersecting MAC curves.
We ask how much technology adoption is optimal, given a particular marginal damage (MD)
2 Jaffe et al. (2002) state that "technology diffusion presumably lowers the aggregate marginal abatement cost function" (p. 54), and this assumption is also made by Milliman and Prince (1989) , Jung et al. (1996) , Goulder and Schneider (1999) , Fischer et al. (2003) , Unold (2001, 2003) , Rosendahl (2004) , Requate (2005b) and others. 3 Papers using clean technologies of this type include Denicolò (1999) , Baudry (2000) , Nordhaus (2002), and Perino (2010) . Baker et al. (2008) Calel (2011) and Brechet and Meunier (2012) have independently derived non-monotonic relationships between environmental regulation and technology adoption. In contrast to us, they both explicitly model output markets and focus exclusively on taxes and tradable permits. They do not consider the effects of heterogeneous firms.
Note that switching back on technology as a response to increasing prices was also found early on in macroeconomic growth models. After Levhari (1965) had incorrectly claimed that reswitching of technologies is impossible in an indecomposable Leontief-Sraffa system, Samuelson (1966) and Levhari and Samuelson (1966) corrected this error, triggering the socalled Robinson-Samuelson controversy summarized in Robinson (1975) and Samuelson (1975) .
This article is organized as follows: In the next section we set up the model. In section 3 we characterize the socially optimal adoption rate contingent on a damage parameter determining the slope of the MD function. In section 4 we look at the relationship between the stringency of policy instruments and the rate of adoption and show that decentralization of the first-best allocation does not cause problems under market-based instruments, notably emission taxes and tradable permits. In section 5 we take a brief look at the case of ex-ante asymmetric firms.
In section 6 we sum up and draw a number of conclusions.
The Model
We consider a continuum of polluting firms indexed by 
The abatement cost functions satisfy the following properties: Amir et al. (2008 ), Bauman et al. (2008 and Brechet and Jouvet (2008) all explicitly model input and output adjustments in their derivation of the particular pattern of crossing MACs used here. For the sake of simplicity we suggest the reduced form approach focusing on MAC curves only. Results are robust to explicit consideration of output. 6 Most of our results hold also for weakly convex abatement functions (e.g. those with constant marginal abatement costs). Exceptions are Propositions 2d) and 5d) that concern the optimality of Pigouvian taxes. While the social optimum will still be an equilibrium under taxes, the equilibrium will no longer be unique if the abatement cost function is not strictly convex in the relevant range, However, this is a well known phenomenon not specific to the contribution of this paper. It also holds if there is only one technology and adoption is not an issue. ) will lead to an increase in aggregate emissions whenever there is at least some diffusion of the new technology. Hence, adoption of a cleaner technology can result in increased emissions, all else being equal.
We use n to denote the index of the marginal firm adopting the new technology. Accordingly, n is also the share of firms that adopt technology I. Total emissions are then given by
where 0 e ( I e ) is a firm's emission level when using the old (new) technology.
The damage from pollution is assumed to depend on aggregate emissions only. Therefore the 
, and
The parameter β therefore leads to an increase of both damage and marginal damage from emissions.
The Social Optimum
First we derive the socially optimal diffusion rate for the new technology as a function of the damage parameter β . Social costs are given by the sum of the abatement costs for both technologies, the costs of adopting the new technology, and pollution damages: A social planner minimizes these costs w.r.t. 0 e , I e , and n subject to non-negativity constraints 0 n ≥ and 1 0 n − ≥ . Applying the Kuhn-Tucker calculus, the first-order conditions
where i λ are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the non-negativity constraints on n and (1 -n).
We can now study how the damage parameter β impacts on the optimal share of adopting firms. For an interior solution, i.e. for 0 0
The numerator is positive if We are now ready to characterize the optimal share of adopting firms as a function of the damage parameter β .
Proposition 1
Assuming the second-order conditions for a social optimum are met, then
• the optimal share of adopting firms is weakly monotonically increasing in β for all β β≤ and weakly monotonically decreasing in β for all β β> ;
• full diffusion is optimal for some interval of damage parameters [ , ] β β containing βˆ if ( ) ( ) Note further that (a) the tunnel shape includes zero adoption for very small and (under the condition specified in Proposition 1) for very large β (see Figure 1) , and that (b) full diffusion may or may not occur for intermediate levels of β. The upper panel in Figure 1 displays two possible shapes of the (β,n) diagram. For both examples no adoption is optimal for small levels of β since adoption costs are strictly positive for all firms. In the example represented by curve n 1 full diffusion is desirable for some range of damage parameters while for sufficiently high damage parameters no firm should adopt. Curve n 2 represents a case where neither full diffusion nor full re-switching to the conventional technology for high damage parameters is optimal. Other combinations of these features are possible as well. The lower panel in Figure 1 presents 
Diffusion and Regulatory Stringency
In the following, we investigate how regulatory stringency affects the rate of diffusion. Using the technologies specified in section 2, we will derive inverted U-shaped relationships between the stringency of three common policy instruments (emission taxes, tradable permits, and uniform emission standards) and the equilibrium rate of diffusion. This complements the monotonicity results obtained by Unold (2001, 2003) for a broad class of technologies (Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman et al., 2008, Brechet and Jouvet 2008) . It also challenges the generality of the induced-diffusion hypothesis by showing (a) that stricter environmental regulation can also reduce -and not only induce -adoption of a given clean technology, and (b) that sufficiently high levels of stringency may prevent the technology from being used at all.
Taxes
We assume that firms' emissions are subject to a uniform and linear emission tax schedule, where we use t to denote the emission tax rate. Profit maximization requires that firms choose emissions such that marginal abatement costs equal the tax rate t regardless of the technology used, i.e. The proof is given in the Appendix. We see that the induced-diffusion hypothesis holds only for sufficiently low tax rates. Above the point where the marginal abatement cost curves intersect, the effect of an increase in stringency is reversed, and further increases in the tax rate reduce adoption incentives. Note that this is not a result of a market or policy failure. A tax set equal to the marginal damage of pollution evaluated at the socially optimal level of pollution always implements the first-best outcome. Again, non-monotonicity rests exclusively on the fact that marginal abatement costs cross in the way specified in Section 2, and hence on the circumstance that the cost advantage of the new technology is nonmonotonic in the level of abatement (Lemma 1). The examples presented in Figure 1 also represent the rate of diffusion (upper panel) and aggregate emissions (lower panel) for emission taxes. The curve n 1 (t) depicted in Figure 1 presents an example where both conditions b) and c) of Proposition 2 on F hold. Note that n 2 (t) is based on linear MAC curves. Accordingly, once the emission tax rate is higher than the MAC of the new technology at zero emissions, the cost advantage and hence the rate of diffusion are independent of t.
Tradable permits
If the government sets an emission cap E and issues a corresponding number of tradable permits to internalize the pollution externality, aggregate emissions will be constrained by The share of adopting firms n adjusts to changes in the permit quantity as follows: The proof is given in the Appendix. The result is illustrated in Figure 2 . The continuous lines represent two possible inverted U-shaped relationships between the aggregate emission cap E and the share of adopting firms n, where we employed the same functional forms and parameters as in the examples shown in Figure 1 . Note that a higher emission cap implies a laxer policy. Thus emission caps close to zero correspond to high damage parameters or high tax rates, respectively, and vice versa. The intuition for this result is exactly the same as for taxes. Indeed, the share of adopting firms under both instruments will be the same if the equilibrium permit price equals the tax rate. 
Proposition 3 a) The share of adopting firms is weakly monotonically increasing in E for

Uniform emission standard
A uniform emission standard imposes a binding upper bound e on a firm's emissions. Since firms are ex-ante symmetric, this policy could achieve the first-best allocation if technology 0 were the only one available. If both technologies are available, the marginal firm n is indifferent between adopting and non-adopting if
For equilibria with interior solutions in n, the relationship between e and n is derived by totally differentiating (4.8), yielding ( ) ( ) 
d) The first-best allocation cannot be implemented by a uniform emission standard if partial adoption is optimal.
The proof is given in the Appendix. In Figure 2 the dashed lines display the relationship between the emission standard e and the share of adopting firms n for the same parameter values used for tradable permits (solid lines in Figure 2 ). This allows a direct comparison of the diffusion rates under the two policy regimes. We observe that emission standards result in smaller diffusion rates than tradable permits for low and high levels of policy stringency while the opposite holds for intermediate levels. This is not by coincidence. For any level of aggregate emissions the adoption incentives for the first firm that considers adopting are no larger under uniform standards than under tradable permits since in the latter case the firm can realize additional gains from trading permits if it adopts. For the last firm, however, adoption incentives under permits are weakly smaller under uniform standards because the permit price has adjusted as a result of other firms adopting the new technology. A more detailed discussion of this effect can be found in Requate and Unold (2003) .
More General Forms of Cost Heterogeneity
In this section we relax the assumption that firms have identical marginal abatement costs curves under the old and the new technology. As a result, more complex patterns of nonmonotonicity may arise. The reason is that, while for each firm adoption incentives are still akin to an inverted U-shape, the peaks will generally differ between firms. So at a given level of policy stringency, some firm i may have already passed its peak, and it may no longer be profitable to adopt the new technology, while another firm k requires an even stricter level before adoption becomes attractive.
To extend our simple model we now represent the firms' technologies by firm-specific abatement cost functions ( ) The proof is analogous to those of Propositions 2 and 3.
For uniform emission standards, we have to re-order firms according to ( ) features three local maxima in the rate of diffusion. The dashed lines in Figure 3 indicate the diffusion rate for each type of firm contributing to ( ) e n 2 . Note that in Figure 3 the rate of diffusion never exceeds 50% and that none of the firms adopting at the first peak of the diffusion rate (at ( ) in Figure 3 , another interesting feature can arise with heterogeneous firms. It is possible that a level of stringency exists for each and every firm at which that firm will adopt. At the same time, there may be no level of stringency at which all firms will adopt. The intuition for this pattern is straightforward and rests on two key ingredients. The first is the inverted U-shape of adoption incentives at the firm level for each policy instrument which has been established in Lemma 1. The second is the heterogeneity between firms and the feature that the intervals of stringencies for which firms adopt may be disjoint. Therefore full diffusion is not guaranteed even if all firms adopt for some level of stringency. 
Conclusions
Recent research on technological innovation has pointed out that marginal abatement cost curves induced by new emission-saving technologies can cross the marginal abatement cost curve resulting from conventional technologies. Accordingly, we have investigated the consequences for both optimal technology adoption and firms' response to more stringent environmental policy. We find that, under sufficient symmetry between firms, the relationship between the rate of advanced technology adoption and the stringency of environmental policy is inverted U-shaped. We further point out that this is by no means a result of market or policy 
Derivation of the first-best allocation and equation (3.5)
The Lagrangian of this problem is
If an interior solution exists ( 0 1 0 = = λ λ ), applying the implicit function theorem to system (3.2) -(3.4) gives the influence of β on n, which is (3.5).
To verify that the denominator is positive, note that the denominator is the determinant of the Hessian Matrix, which has to be positive for a cost minimum (as part of the positive definiteness condition).
Proof of Proposition 1
For interior solutions of n, the proof for the first part of Proposition 1 follows from (3.5) . 
is non-positive.
Proof of Equation (4.3)
Applying the implicit function theorem and differentiating conditions (4.1) and (4.2) w.r.t. t yields (4.3).
Proof of Proposition 2
For interior solutions of n, the proof for the first part of Proposition 2 is contained in the main text as part of the discussion of Equation (4.3). To study corner solutions n = 0 (n = 1), we differentiate the left-hand side of (4.2), i.e. the cost advantage of adoption by the first (last) firm w.r.t. t, yielding ( 
Proof of Equation (4.8)
By eliminating ρ from (4.5) -(4.7), the equilibrium conditions become Applying the implicit function theorem to interior solutions, the relationship between n and E is given by (4.8). Note that the denominator is strictly positive if a socially optimal permit quantity exists.
Proof of Proposition 3
For interior solutions of n, the proof for the first part of Proposition 3 is contained in the main text as part of the discussion of Equation (4.8). To study corner solutions n = 0 (n = 1), we again differentiate the left-hand side of (4.7), i.e. the cost advantage of adoption by the first (last) firm w.r.t. E , yielding ( ) ( 
Proof of Proposition 4
From (4.8) it follows that the last firm is indifferent between adoption and non-adoption if 
Proof of Proposition 5 (d)
The first-order conditions for the social optimum with heterogeneous firms are equivalent to 
